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Abstract 
Game theory provides useful insights into the way parties that share a scarce resource may 
plan their utilization of the resource under different situations. This review provides a brief 
and self-contained introduction to the theory of cooperative games. It can be used to get 
acquainted with the basics of cooperative games. Its goal is also to provide a basic 
introduction to this theory, in connection with a couple of surveys that analyze its use in the 
context of environmental problems and models.  The main models (bargaining games, 
transfer utility and non transfer utility games) and issues and solutions are considered: 
bargaining solutions, single-value solutions like the Shapley value and the nucleolus, and 
multi-value solutions such as the core. The cooperative game theory (CGT) models that are 
reviewed in this paper favor solutions that include all possible players and ignore the strategic 
stages leading to coalition building.  They focus on the possible results of the cooperation by 
answering questions such as: Which coalitions can be formed? And how can the coalitional 
gains be divided in order to secure a sustainable agreement?  An important aspect associated 
with the solution concepts of CGT is the equitable and fair sharing of the cooperation gains.  
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A SEMI-TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
Resource scarcity is a growing concern to individuals as well as to governments.   
Competition over smaller amounts of water and other environmental amenities of 
deteriorating quality is increasingly becoming common in many parts of the world.  As more 
have to share less, the question of strategic behavior becomes imminent.  In such a situation, 
Game Theory (GT) may provide useful insights into the way parties that share a scarce 
resource should plan their utilization of the resource under different situations.   
The purpose of this working paper is twofold.  First it provides the basic building blocks of 
Cooperative Game Theory (CGT), presented in simple and applicable terms.  Second, it 
reviews the literature dealing with application of cooperative game theory in environmental 
and water resources and explores the possibilities of expanding its use.  The paper does not 
provide a general introduction to GT, or even to CGT: it is just a sketchy introduction, 
focusing on the tools that have been used in applications to water and environmental 
problems.  The goal is to offer a self-contained introduction, instrumental to the reading and 
understanding of companion surveys, for people who do not have a general GT background. 
What is Game Theory? 
Game Theory (hereafter GT) is the study of mathematical modeling of strategic behavior of 
decision makers (players), in situations where one player’s decisions may affect the other 
players.  The basic assumption of Game Theory is that decision makers are rational players, 
that they are intelligent, so, while pursuing well-defined objectives, players take into account 
other decision-makers’ rationality and, accordingly, build expectations on their behavior.  
GT consists of a modeling part and a solution part.  Mathematical models of conflicts and of 
cooperation provide strategic behavioral patterns, and the resulting payoffs to the players are 
determined according to certain solution concepts. 
There are two main branches of GT.
1  The first is non-cooperative Game Theory (hereafter 
NCGT) and the second is cooperative Game Theory (hereafter CGT).  The main distinction 
between the two is that NCGT models situations where players see only their own strategic 
objectives and thus binding agreements among the players are not possible, while CGT 
actually is based mainly on agreements to allocate cooperative gains (solution concepts).  
Therefore, while NCGT models describe and take into account the strategic interaction 
among the players, CGT ignores the strategic stages leading to coalition building and focuses 
on the possible results of the cooperation.  CGT attempts answering questions such as which 
coalitions can be formed?  And how can the coalitional gains be divided in order to secure a 
sustainable agreement?  In particular, CGT favors solutions that include all possible players 
(Grand Coalition), and thus most CGT solution concepts refer to the Grand Coalition. 
An important aspect associated with the solution concepts of CGT is the equitable and fair 
sharing of the cooperation gains.  Young (1994) notices that equity is something dealt with in 
everyday life.  One can refer to equity in a comprehensive framework, that is, social justice: a 
proper distribution of resources, welfare, rights, duties, opportunities, or in the narrow 
framework, for example, how to solve everyday distributive problems.  This second case is 
the one more frequently addressed by GT, which provides the tools to examine equity in a 
                                                 
1 Additional typologies hold as well, e.g.,  static and dynamic games, one-shot games and repeated games.   4
rigorous way, and the problem turns out to be a choice between rules under an axiomatic 
perspective.  But, as Young underlines, the axiomatic approach has two weaknesses: first, the 
axioms, reasonable by themselves, may lead to “impossibility theorems”; second, the 
axiomatic method may result in a solution that is too far from the practical problem dealt 
with: the perceived equity always depends on the particulars of the case.  Furthermore, the 
empirical rules of equity, that one can see applied in real situations, are usually more 
complex than a single normative principle, and often represent a balance or compromise 
between competing principles. 
The term fairness in the literature is sometimes used as a synonym for equity, but some 
authors often mean something different: their idea of fairness coincides with the acceptability 
and stability of the cost-benefit apportionment among the players. 
As was indicated above, the following background is not intended to provide a 
comprehensive technical basis in GT.  Readers who wish to widen their familiarity with the 
field of GT could refer to Owen (1995), Myerson (1991), Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), 
Driessen (1988), Peters (1997), and Aumann and Hart (1992, 1994, 2002). 
THE COOPERATIVE BARGAINING PROBLEM  
A GT approach to bargaining was first introduced in Nash (1950), who developed a 
cooperative and static game model.  In a two-person bargaining problem, two players have 
access to a set of alternatives, which is called the feasible set.  It is assumed that each player 
has preferences over the alternatives, and that the preferences are represented by a couple of 
functions  1 u  and  2 u .  In the original approach by Nash, as in many later developments, it has 
been assumed that these utility functions are von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
2. 
The utility functions,  1 u  and  2 u , define a subset S of R
2, which is the image of the set of 
feasible alternatives.  Each point of S represents a solution for the bargaining problem that is 
an agreement between the players.  Note that the solution is defined in the ‘image’ space, so 
that in principle it could correspond to more different ‘equivalent’ agreements.  
Within the feasible set there is also a point, called threat point or disagreement point, which 
is where “the game ends” should no agreement be reached.  We will call S the feasible set 
and d the disagreement point.  
While defining his axiomatic solution, Nash wanted it to be a rule that associates a point of S 
with each problem (S,  d).  To develop it, we will introduce the formal model (and an 
example), then we will report the Nash axiomatic solution and finally we will present some of 
the other solution concepts proposed after Nash. 
Definition: A two-person bargaining problem is a pair (S, d) such that 
S is convex, closed (it contains its boundary) and a comprehensive
3 subset of R
2; 
dS ∈ , and there exists at least one  x S ∈  such that  x d >
4; 
                                                 
2 von Neumann-Morgenstern utility: An axiomatic extension of the ordinal concept of utility to uncertain 
payoffs. An agent characterized by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ranks uncertain payoffs 
according to (higher) expected value of the utility of the individual outcomes that may occur.  
3 
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{ } :| d Sx S x d =∈ ≥ is a compact set. 
We’ll call B2 the set of two-person bargaining problems. 
EXAMPLE: dividing wine (no money admitted). 
A father says to his two sons: “Here is a container of 9 liters of wine; if you come to an 
agreement in order to divide the wine, then it is yours, otherwise I’ll take the container back.” 
The possible shares are ( ) ,9 ,  0 9 tt t −≤ ≤ .  Assume that an amount x has utility  () 1 ux  for 










A generic splitting () ,9 tt −  provides the couple of utility values ( ) ,9 tt − .  This situation 
leads to a bargaining problem (S,  d), where d  = (0, 0) (no wine) and 




Definition: A solution for two-person bargaining problems is a map φ: B2
2 R →  satisfying: 
(,) Sd S φ ∈ , for all ( , ) Sd∈B2; 
(,) Sd d φ ≥ , for all (,) ∈ Sd B2. 
A solution associates with each bargaining element (,) Sd∈B2  a unique point of S  
interpreted as a prediction, or recommendation, for that bargaining problem.   
In the axiomatic characterization of his solution concept, Nash required some properties and 
proved that they characterize only one solution, now called the Nash solution of bargaining 
problems.   
                                                                                                                                                        
4  ( ) ( )
2
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The main bargaining solutions 
The Nash solution 
As mentioned before, the Nash bargaining solution is based on several axioms: 
1. Individual Rationality. Each player receives at least what he would receive in the threat 
point, that is, for all (,) Sd∈B2 we have  ( ) , Sd d ≥ φ ; 
2. Pareto optimality. This is a standard efficiency condition and means that all gains from 
cooperation should be shared.  Formally, it is expressed as follow: 
φ  satisfies the Pareto optimality if, for each (,) Sd∈B2 and for each  x S ∈ , (,) x Sd φ ≥ ; then 
(,) x Sd φ = ; 
3. Independence from  Irrelevant Alternatives.  If an alternative is judged to be the solution to 
a problem, then it should still be considered the most suitable for any sub-problem containing 
it.   Formally, it is expressed as follows: 
φ  satisfies this property if  (,) Sd T φ ∈  implies  (,) (,) Td Sd φ φ = , for each (,) Sd∈B2 and for 
each TS ⊂  such that (,) ∈ Td  B2; 
4. Covariance under positive affine transformations.  The solution is required to be 
independent of any particular members in the families of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
utility functions (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) representing the agents’ preferences 
chosen to describe the problem.  Formally, it is expressed as follows: 
A positive affine transformation is a map A: R
2→ R
2 such that, for every  { } 1, 2 i∈ , 
() ii i i A xa x b =+ ,  
where  1212 ,,, R aabb∈ ,  1 a  and  2 a  being positive ( ( ) i A x  denotes the i-th component of 
() A x ).  
φ  satisfies covariance with positive affine transformation if, for each (,) Sd∈B2 and for each 
positive affine transformation  A, ( ( ), ( )) ( ( , )) A SA d A S d φ φ = ; 
5. Symmetry.  If the bargaining problem is invariant with interchanging the agents, the 
solution should give the same to both.  Formally, it is expressed as follows: 
φ  satisfies symmetry if, for each (,) Sd∈B2 such that S  is symmetric (i.e.  12 (, ) x xS ∈  then 
21 (,) x xS ∈ ) and  12 dd = , it holds that  12 (,) (,) Sd Sd φ φ = . 
Nash proved that there is a unique solution, Ω, satisfying all these axioms, that is expressed 
in the following formula: 
Ω= ( )( ) 1122 max
d S x dxd −− . 
No axiom is universally applicable; for a critique to the set of these 5 axioms see Thomson 
(1994).  
The Nash solution has been generalized by Harsanyi (1959) for n players with n > 2.  The 








=− ∏ .   7
The Kalai-Smorodinski solution 
Kalai and Smorodinski (1975) thought that the Nash solution does not take sufficiently into 
account the aspirations of the players: they believed that if the preferences and the utility 
values of the players change, the compromise point between the agents should not vary.  
They proposed a solution taking into account the aspiration levels of the players.  The 
property introduced is the following: 
Individual monotonicity.  It requires that an expansion of the feasible set “in a direction 
favorable to a particular agent”, always benefits the agent.  Formally it is expressed as 
follows: 
Let ( , ) i uS d be  { } max | id x xS ∈  (for  2 n = ): if TS ⊇ , and  () () jj uT uS = , then 
(,) (,) ii Td Sd φ φ ≥ , for ij ≠ . 
By simply replacing independence of irrelevant alternatives by individual monotonicity in the 
list of axioms proposed by Nash, Kalai and Smorodinski obtained the characterization of their 
proposed solution. 
The Kalai-Smorodinski solution (a unique solution satisfying the above axioms) is:  
For every (,) Sd∈B2,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, Sd d t uSd d φ = +−  
where  () ( ) { } max R | , d tt d t u S d d S =∈ + − ∈ . 
Although there are several solutions to bargaining problems; the two solutions presented here 
are the most important ones.  Other solution concepts in the game theoretical literature can be 
found in Peters (1992).  For example, Armstrong (1994) applies the Salukvadze solution (Yu 
and Leitman, 1974) to a fishery management problem. 
N-PERSON COOPERATIVE GAMES 
Definition: An n-person cooperative game in the characteristic function form is an ordered 
pair  ( ) , GN v =  where  { } 1,2,..., Nn =  is a finite set with n elements. 
{ } 1,2,... Nn =  is the set of players.  A subset S of the player set N (notation: S ⊆ N) is called 
coalition, and the collection of 2
n coalitions of N (i.e.  ( ) P N ) is denoted by 2
n, including N 
itself, the empty set and all the one-element subsets.  
( ) :R vPN→  is real-valued function defined over all the subsets of N and such that 
( ) 0 v ∅= , where ∅is the empty set. 
N is the grand coalition and it consists of the set of all the players.  The number of the players 
of a coalition S is denoted by  S  or, sometimes, s.  v is the characteristic function, or 
coalitional function, and assigns a “worth”  ( ) vS to each coalition S.
 5 
                                                 
5 It is necessary to note that the characteristic function is defined considering only the players within 
coalition  S, without considering those players which are outside of the coalition and that, specifically in 
environmental issues, could affect () vS. For a better explanation, see Section 6.   8
In many cases the elements of the players’ set N represent real people, e.g., landowners and 
peasants, traders, creditors or voters, but the player set can also consist of more abstract 
membership, such as sectors, as in the well-known Tennessee Valley Authority case (Straffin 
and Heaney), or (in the “airport game”) of landing by planes, or agricultural associations and 
city water services. 
It is often assumed that the coalitional/characteristic function is expressed in units of an 
infinitely divisible commodity which “stores” utility, and which can be transferred without 
loss to the players.  If a subset of players (coalition) can obtain a total utility v, this utility 
can be divided among the members of the coalition in any possible way.  It is also assumed 
that there exist some transferable commodity that enables the transfers among players in 
order to reallocate the benefits gained through the coalition, and that there is a common scale 
to compare the players’ utilities. 
The theory developed based on these assumptions is called the side-payments theory.  We 
will call games satisfying the above presumptions transferable utility games, or TU-games.  
We will often refer to ( ) , Nv simply as v, and will denote by  ( ) GN the class of TU-games 
with set of players N.  The coalitional function is often called a game (with transferable 
utility) in the characteristic form.  
Definition: In a TU-game  () vG N ∈  v is superadditive if, for all  , ST N ⊆ , with ST ∩= ∅ , 
( ) ( ) ( ) vS T vS vT ∪≥ + . 
Definition: Let  () vG N ∈ . v is said to be constant-sum if, for all SN ⊆ , 
( ) ( ) ( ) \ vS vN S vN += . 
If a game is superadditive, then players have real incentives for cooperation, in the sense that 
the union of any two disjoint groups of players shall never diminish the total benefits; the 
merger of the disjoint coalitions can only improve their prospects.  The superadditivity of the 
game is guaranteed in case v(S) is defined as the total amount of utility that coalition C can 
guarantee for itself, irrespective of the strategies adopted by the remaining players (see the 
definition of the α - characteristic function given in the last section). It is not always sensible 
to assume superadditivity, and this assumption may be questioned in some environmental 
applications, due to the presence of externalities (again, see the last section for some 
comments on this issue). Assuming superadditivity means that the grand coalition is efficient, 
thus the problem may turn to be the sharing of the overall utility  ( ) vN among all the players.  
In this paper we focus on the class of superadditive games, explicitly specifying if a particular 
game doesn’t fulfill the above condition.  A stronger notion than superadditivity is convexity. 
Definition: Let  ( ) vG N ∈ . v is convex if for all coalitions S and T, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) vS T vS T vS vT ∪+ ∩≥ + . 
An equivalent definition is that for any player i, and any coalitions ST ⊃  not containing i, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) vS i vS vT i vT ∪− ≥ ∪− .  The larger the coalition, the greater the marginal 
contribution
6 of new members. 
                                                 
6 For the concept of Marginal Contribution see the section of the Shapley value   9
With the characteristic function at hand and supposing that the players agree to work together 
on a certain objective, they will have to divide the total payoff v(N) of the grand coalition.  
“An allocation problem arises whenever a bundle of resources, rights, burdens, or costs is 
temporarily held in common by a group of individuals and must be allotted to them 
individually.  An allocation or distribution is an assignment of the objects to specific 
individuals.” (Young, 1994: p.7) 
An allocation, usually, requires two different types of decisions: (a) the choice of the total 
amount of the good to be distributed and (b) the formula or principle of the allocation of that 
amount.  The focus in this review is on the second choice. “An allocation rule is a method, 
process, or formula, which allocates any given supply of goods among any potential group of 
claimants according to the salient characteristics of these claimants.” (Young, 1994) 
A distribution of the amount of v(N) among the players will be represented by a real value 
function x on the player set N satisfying the efficiency principle: 




= ∑ . 
Here x(i), also denoted xi, represents the payoff to player i, according to the involved payoff 
function x.  
We usually identify the function  R
N x∈  on N with the corresponding n-tuple 
( ) 1,, R
N
n xx x =∈ K  of real numbers, called allocation.  The vectors  R
n x∈ satisfying the 
efficiency principle are called efficient payoff vectors or pre-imputations. 
Most of the proposed solution concepts meet also the individual rationality principle, 
requiring that the payoff to any player i by the payoff vector x be at least the amount that 
player i can attain by himself. 
This determines the set of imputations: 
Definition: Let  ( ) vG N ∈ . An imputation of v is a vector  R





= ∑ ,     (efficiency) 
, ii x v ≥  for all iN ∈ .   (individual  rationality) 
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∈
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=∈ = ≥ ∀ ∈ ⎨⎬
⎩⎭ ∑ . 
() Iv denotes the set of imputations of v. It is the set of allocations of  ( ) vN among the 
players satisfying efficiency and individual rationality (that is, as we already mentioned, one 
player joining a coalition should gain at least what he/she would get playing alone).  
Applying superadditivity repeatedly (i.e.: adding the players one by one), it is clear that 









=∑ , and  ,   ii x vi ≥∀  (x is an imputation), then  ,   ii x vi = ∀ .  There is only 
one imputation and the game is called inessential.  In this situation, there isn’t any incentive 
to form coalitions because they don’t get more than the sum of the stand-alone payoffs.  The 
other games are called essential.   10
An important approach, developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) deals with the 
concepts of dominance, D-Core and Stable Sets.  We couldn’t find, in our literature review of 
CGT and environmental and water resources, any explicit applications of this approach, but 
still, we have to mention it because of its relevance in GT evolution.  
In a game we may find many allocations satisfying the requisites above, namely being 
imputations, but what we might need is a criterion to make a distinction between different 
possible imputations.  Dominance is such a criterion. 
Definition: Given  ( ) vG N ∈ , a non-empty SN ⊆ , and  ( ) , x yI v ∈ , then x  dominates  y 
through S if: 





≤ ∑ .  This states that the players of S are able, via cooperation by themselves, to 
obtain the allocation x. 
As we will better observe later, CGT tools are used not only to share benefits from 
cooperation, but also to allocate costs.  In this case it is useful to consider a cost function c 
instead of v, and this change doesn’t introduce substantial differences in the model.  In such a 
cost allocation situation it’s also possible to develop a model dealing with the function v, 
which describes the savings of the players that are the result of cooperation.  
The main goal of the theory of TU-games is to select, for every TU-game, an allocation, or a 
set of allocations, which is admissible to the players.  
In the next section we will present some of the most important CGT solution concepts, which 
have been associated with the applications that we found in the literature on CGT and 
environmental and water resources.   
As we indicated earlier, the questions addressed in a CGT model are: 
1.  Which coalitions form? 
2.  If the grand coalition forms, how do the players divide v(N) (or allocate costs)? 
The solution concepts give many answers to these questions.  
One can find two groups of solution concepts: (a) Subset solution concepts: Core (Gillies, 
1953; Shapley, 1971), D-Core,  Stable sets (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), 
bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler, 1964), Kernel,  Least Core, and (b) One-point 
(unique) solution concepts: Nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969), Shapley value (Shapley, 1953); τ -
value (Tijs, 1981).   
Apart from those quoted above, in the GT literature other solutions can be found, or variants.  
In this paper, we’ll confine ourselves to an overview of the CGT solution concepts that have 
been applied in the literature on environmental and water resources issues. 
Subset solution concepts 
The solution concepts in this group refer to a ‘range’ of values that fulfill certain conditions 
as will be seen below.  The flexibility subset solution concepts provide is very convenient in 
practice as they allow the decision maker consideration of various policy interventions and 
their evaluation.   11
The Core 
This concept was introduced by Gillies (1953).  An allocation satisfying the two properties 
(efficiency and individual rationality) stated before is an imputation.  From a “practical” point 
of view, an imputation is a distribution of gains that satisfies only the individual rationality.  
A similar condition for coalitions should also be taken into account.  
So, we can introduce another condition, called coalitional rationality that extends the concept 
of individual rationality to each of the coalitions. 
Definition: Let  ( ) vG N ∈ . A Core element of a game v is an allocation  R
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Core allocations provide incentives for cooperation. If the Core exists, however, there are 
usually an uncountable number of allocations.  Which is the most equitable?  Thus, two 
problems may arise: first, the Core may have more than one allocation; second the Core 
might be empty.  The two following examples underline these problems.   
EXAMPLE: a game with a nonempty Core. 
Consider the game  () , GN v =  with  { } 1, 2,3 N = and v defined as follows: 

























The simplex in 
3 R , with vertexes (12, 0, 0), (0, 12, 0), (0, 0,12) represents the part of the pre-







= ∑ ) which satisfies xi ≥ 0. Individual rationality is already satisfied 
for players 1 and 2, but to get the imputation set we have to consider the condition for player 
3 also (see the line  ( ) 3 31 xv ≥=  in the figure below).   12
(The arrows stand for the direction of the inequalities.) 
Source: Authors 
The set of imputations consists of all 
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We know that  123 12 xxx ++=, thus we can substitute  12 3 12 x xx + =− (and similarly for the 
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that is exactly what we can see represented in the above figure. 
EXAMPLE: a game with an empty Core.   13
A typical example of a game with an empty Core is the simple majority game.  A coalition 
wins if it is composed by more than half of the participants,  { } 1,2,...., Nn = . Then: 
()













The Core conditions for this game provide no solutions.  
For example, if we consider a three-person simple majority game we will have:  { } 1, 2,3 N =  
and 
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There is no ( ) 123 ,, x xx satisfying the above conditions. In fact, if we sum the third, fourth and 
fifth inequality we get: 





xxx + +≥ , 
and this is impossible because of the last Core condition (efficiency). 
Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) provided necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
game to have a nonempty Core in terms of balanced conditions. 
Theorem: (Bondareva, 1963 and Shapley, 1967) A TU-game has nonempty Core if and only 
if it is balanced
7. 
Another well-known relation between convexity of games and the existence of Core elements 
is as follows: 
Theorem: (Shapley, 1971) If a game ( ) , Nv is convex, then  ( ) Cv is a nonempty set. 
                                                 
7 Entering into a detailed analysis of the concept of balancedness, is not useful in this paper.   14
Note that convexity implies that the game has a nonempty Core, but the reverse is not true. 
The bargaining set 
The  bargaining set was introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1964).  Here we follow 
Maschler (1992). It is necessary to start form this concept, in order to better understand two 
other game theoretic concepts: the Kernel and the Nucleolus. 
The idea is that it is necessary to have a process through which it is possible to allocate the 
gains from cooperation when the grand coalition has not been formed, but we have a certain 
coalition structure: 
Definition: Let ( ) , Nv be a TU-game.  A coalition structure is a partition B ={B1,…,Bk} of 




i Bi = N and for all ij ≠ , Bi ∩Bj = ∅. 
When a particular coalition structure is formed, it is necessary to define an appropriate payoff 
configuration, satisfying individual and group rationality. 
We will use the notation x(Bi)=∑ h h x , with h∈Bi, to indicate the sum of the payoffs of the 
players in a certain coalition Bi. 
Definition: An imputation for a coalition structure B is a payoff vector 
( ) 12 , ,..., n x xx x = satisfying: 
x(Bi) = v(Bi), for all Bi in B    (coalitional rationality); 
{ } ( ) i x vi ≥ , for all i in  N           (individual rationality). 
We denote by X(B) the space of all the imputations for the coalition structure Bi. 
The players belonging to each coalition try to reach their best outcome advancing proposals 
about their needs, according with the imputation. 
Definition: Let x be an imputation in a game ( ) , Nv for a coalition structure B. Let k  and l 
be two distinct players in a coalition Bi of B. An objection of k  against l at  x is a 
pair( ) , Sy, satisfying: 
,    ,    ; SNk Sl S ⊂∈ ∉  
( ) ( ) R,     ;
S yy S v S ∈=   ,   all  ii yx i S >∈ . 
This is a way for k  to inform l that he could gain more someplace else, and to say to l that 
he should transfer some of its gains tok .  
But l can answer with a counter-objection: 
Definition: Let ( ) , Sy be an objection of k  against l at  x,  x∈  X(B),  , ∈ kl Bi∈B.  A 
counter-objection to this objection is a pair ( ) , Tz, satisfying: 
, ,  TN l T k T ⊂∈∉ ; 
( ) ( ) R,  
T zz T v T ∈= ; 
, all   in T ii zy i S ≥∩ ;   15
, all   in T \ ii zx i S ≥ . 
In the counter-objection, player l claims that he can assure to himself his gain by formingT .  
It is important to note that k  can object against l only if they belong to the same coalition of 
the coalition structure.  The objection is justified if it has no counter-objection; otherwise, the 
objection is unjustified.  
The bargaining set will be defined as follows: 
Definition: Let ( ) , Nv be a cooperative game with side payments. The bargaining set  1
i M (B) 
for a coalition structure B  is: 
1
i M (B) := {x∈ X(B): every objection at x can be countered}  
= {x∈ X(B): there exists no justified objection at x}. 
When a particular coalition structure has formed, the aim is to find a particular imputation in 
order to create some “stability” among the coalitions in the coalition structure. 
To compute, at least partially, the bargaining set, the Kernel has been introduced.  If the game 
is superadditive, then the Kernel is non-empty and it is a subset of the bargaining set. 
The Kernel 
For the n-person game v, let S be a coalition (SN ⊆ ) and  ( ) 1,..., n x xx =  a payoff vector (not 
necessarily an imputation). 
We define excess of S with regards to the imputation x as the quantity  




=− ∑ . 
corresponding to the difference between the value of the coalition S (given by the 
characteristic function) and the utility received according to x.  
If we consider two different players (ij ≠ ) the surplus of i against j can be defined as: 
( ) ( ) max , , ij s xe S x =  
where the maximum is taken over all coalitions S such that  x S ∈  and  j S ∉ .  
Thus,  ij s  represents the maximum gain that player i can hope to get without the cooperation 
of j. 
Now, if we consider an individually rational payoff configuration x, we can say that i 
outweighs j (notation ij ff ) if and only if: 
( ) ( ) ij ji s xs x >   and   ( ) j x vj > . 
If ij ff  there is a certain instability, because i can make j a demand that he cannot counter. 
The Kernel is the set of individually rational payoff configurations for which such instability 
does not occur, that is  SN ∀⊆ , there are no  , ij S ∈ , such that ij ff .   16
The Least Core 
Given an n-person game v, we can consider any coalition SN ⊆  and any imputation 
( ) ( ) 1,..., n x xxI v =∈ ; the excess of S with regard to the imputation x is described by the 
quantity 




=− ∑ . 
Let  () 1 ex  be the largest excess of any coalition relative to x,  ( ) 2 ex  the second largest 
excess,  () 3 ex  the next and so on. 
The Least Core is the set  1 X  of all x that minimize  ( ) 1 ex . 
Unique (One-point) solution concepts 
Under this group of solution concepts we find several solution concepts such as the 
Nucleolus, the Kernel, the Shapley Value, and the τ -value. 
The Nucleolus 
Starting from the definition of the Least Core, let  2 X  be the set of all x in  1 X  that minimize 
( ) 2 ex ,  3 X  the set of all x in  2 X  that minimize  ( ) 3 ex , … 
This process will eventually lead to an  k X consisting of a single imputation x (as Schmeidler 
proved), called the Nucleolus. 
We can better understand and formalize this concept defining the 2
n-vector  ( ) x θ , as the 
vector whose components are the excesses of the 2
n subsets SN ⊆ , arranged in decreasing 
order, i.e., 
( ) ( ) ( ) , kk SN xe S x θ
⊂ =  
where  12 2 , ,..., n SS S are the subsets of N arranged by ( ) ( ) 1 ,, kk eS x eS x + ≥ . 
EXAMPLE: For the three person game v, where  ( ) 1 vS= , if S has two or three players 
and  ( ) 0 vS=  otherwise, the payoff vectors x = (0.3, 0.5, 0.2) and y = (0.1, 0.5, 0.4) give the 
following excesses: 
S  e(S, x)  e(S, y) 
∅  0 0 
1  - 0.3  - 0.1 
2  - 0.5  - 0.5 
3  - 0.2  - 0.4 
1, 2  0.2  0.4 
1, 3  0.5  0.5 
2, 3  0.3  0.1 
N 0  0   17
 
We get  ( ) ( ) 0.5,0.3,0.2,0,0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5 x θ =− − −   
and  ( ) ( ) 0.5,0.4,0.1,0,0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.5 y θ =− − − . 
We can order the several vectors  ( ) x θ  by the lexicographic order.  The lexicographic order 
can be applied comparing the first components of two vectors: if they are equal, compare the 
seconds and so on, until we find two different components.  The (lexicographically) bigger 
vector will be the one containing the higher of these two different components.  Formally, 
given two vectors  ( ) 1,..., q α αα =  and  ( ) 1,..., q β ββ = , we say that α is lexicographically 
smaller than β if there is some integer k,  1 kq ≤ ≤ , such that: 







and we can write  L α β < . (In the above example  ( ) ( ) L x y θθ < .) 
The  Nucleolus is the imputation that minimizes the function  ( ) x θ  (in the lexicographic 
order).  If the Core is non-empty, then it can be proved that the Nucleolus lies in the Core. 
The Shapley value 
Several solution concepts are introduced in an axiomatic way (as we have seen in Nash and 
Kalai-Smorodinski): it means that the solution is built as a consequence of some properties 
that must be satisfied.  Usually these properties are applied to a class of games.  For this 
reason, we consider  () GN, the class of superadditive games with a given set N of players.  
We shall assume the N is a finite set containing n elements. 
Shapley proposed to consider a mapping  : ( ) R
n GN φ → , satisfying the following properties: 




= ∑ .  This property 
means that all the available amount must be allocated by the solution; 
The Dummy player property:  φ  satisfies this property if, for every  () vG N ∈  and every 
dummy player iN ∈ ,  ( ) ( ) i vv i φ = .  
A player is a dummy player if  { } ( ) ( ) ( ) vS i vS vi ∪= + for all coalition   such that  Si S ∉ , that 
is its contribution to S is only  () vi.  (A special case of dummy player is a null player: a null 
player does not generate any benefits and should receive nothing); 
Anonymity:  φ  satisfies anonymity if, for every  ( ) vG N ∈  and every  , ij N ∈  that are 
interchangeable
8 players in v, it holds that  ( ) ( ) ij vv φφ = .  This property means that the value 
must treat equally strong players in an equal way; 
                                                 
8 If two players equivalently contribute in the game, we say that they are interchangeable. Formally, 
, ij N ⊂  are said to be interchangeable players in the game v  if, for every coalition  { } \, SNi j ⊂ , 
{ } ( ) { } ( ) vS i vS i ∪=∪   18
Additivity:  φ  satisfies additivity if, for every  ( ) , vw G N ∈ , it holds that 
( ) ( ) ( ) vw v w φφ φ += + .  It is difficult to justify this axiom with regards to fairness, but it is 
an obviously useful property for the solution. 
Shapley proved that there exists a unique value  : ( ) R
n GN φ →  that satisfies those four 
properties: 












=∪ − ∑ , 
for all  ( ) vG N ∈  and all iN ∈ , when s and n denote the cardinality of S and N, respectively. 
We can interpret the Shapley value as follows: given a game  ( ) vG N ∈ , we consider any 
permutation π  of the set N and any player iN ∈ .  If  ( ) , P i π  is the set of players that precede 
i in the permutation π ,  ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, , Mi vPi i vPi π ππ =∪ −  is the marginal contribution 
of i to the coalition  ( ) , P i π .  
The Shapley value  : ( ) R







φ π = ∑ . 
In order to better understand this concept, consider a situation with n players agreeing to meet 
in a certain room; imagine the n players entering one at a time into that room in a random 
order (specified by the permutation π , that is, all possible arrival orderings are equally 
probable) and that each player, as soon as he enters and reaches the coalition S created by the 
players arrived before him, receives a reward equal to  { } ( ) ( ) vS i vS ∪− , that is his marginal 
contribution.  
The Shapley value is the mean marginal contribution, averaged on all of the n! permutations 
π. 
EXAMPLE: Consider the three-person game: 
{}
20 ) 3 , 2 , 1 (
15 ) 3 , 2 ( ; 7 ) 3 , 1 ( ; 4 ) 2 , 1 (
0 ) 3 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 (










The marginal contributions are given in the following table: 
π M  (1, π) M (2, π) M (3, π)
(1, 2, 3) 0  4  16 
(1, 3, 2) 0  13  7 
(2, 1, 3) 4  0  16 
(2, 3, 1) 5  0  15 
(3, 1, 2) 7  13  0 
(3, 2, 1) 5  15  0   19




, that is, by 
definition, the Shapley value for this game. 
Theorem: Let ( ) , Nv be a TU-game. Then the following statements are equivalent: 
The game is convex (that is, for any  , ST N ⊆ ,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) vS vT vS T vS T +≤ ∩ + ∪ ); 
For each permutation π, the marginal contribution vector is in the Core. 
The Shapley value, being the mean marginal contribution averaged on the permutation π  in 
all of the n! possible cases, is in the Core of a convex game. 
The τ - value 
The τ - value is a feasible compromise between two vectors: M(v), that is the marginal vector 
(utopia vector) and m(v), that is the minimum right vector (see below for further explanation). 
For player i we define: 
( ) ( ) { } ( ) :\ i M vv Nv N i =−  
(Marginal contribution of player i to the grand coalition. It is the best payoff player i can hope 
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(Minimum right for player i, called the remainder for i in the coalition S, if all the other 
players in S obtain their respective utopia payoffs.) 
 
One can prove that  ( ) ( ) ( ) ,   ,  for each   ii i x Cv mv x M v i N ∀∈ ≤ ≤ ∈ , that is m and M are 
upper and lower bounds, respectively, for the Core of the game. 
As we saw in the section about the Core, games with a nonempty Core are balanced. 
A game is called Quasi Balanced (QB) if:  
( ) ( )
() ( )
() ( )
















One can prove that each balanced game is quasi balanced. 
For a QB game,  () v τ  is the unique efficient payoff vector on the line segment 












⎩⎭ ∑ .   20
 
Source: Authors 
Modifications to the above solution concepts 
Many modifications of the above solution concepts have been applied in the environmental 
CGT literature and some of them even were developed from a case study. 
The weak Least Core
  (Hashimoto et al., 1982) (and, equivalently, the weak Nucleolus) is 
obtained by finding the least ε  for which there is a solution x to the system: 
( )
()




x vS S S N
xv N





This might be interpreted as imposing a minimum uniform tax on any individual player that 
joins a coalition. 
The proportional Least Core
 (Hashimoto et al., 1982) (and the proportional Nucleolus) can 
model a similar situation, where we have to impose a minimum tax (or subsidy) on each 
coalition proportionally to the respective costs associated with this coalition (in a cost game).  
Thus we can postulate a tax rate t and the system to be solved will be: 
( ) ( )
()











Another modified Nucleolus is the Normalized Nucleolus
  (Davos and Lejano, 1995): the 




, which stands, for example, for the economical 
rate of return of joining a coalition.  Rogers
 (1994) refers to the weak Nucleolus as the per-
capita Nucleolus. 
Also for the Shapley value many variants have been proposed.  Of all the properties that 
characterize the Shapley value, symmetry seemed to be the most “innocuous”.  Yet from a 
modeling point of view, this assumption is perhaps the trickiest because it calls for a 
judgment about what should be treated equally. 
Furthermore in the Shapley case all SN ⊆  are assumed to be possible, and all the orderings 
of users joining a coalition are equally likely; this assumption also might be unrealistic. 
These are the reasons why the Weighted Shapley value (Generalized Shapley value) has been 
introduced, taking into account the probability of formation for the coalitions [Loehman and   21
Whinston (1976)
 , Shapley (1981)
 , Kalai and Samet (1987), Young (1994).  For a review of 
the literature on weighted Shapley values see Kalai and Samet (1988). 
NON TRANSFERABLE UTILITY (NTU)-GAMES
  
An NTU-game is a pair () , NV  where  { } 1,..., = Nn  and where V  is a map assigning to each 
{ } 2\ ∈∅
N S  a subset  ( ) VS of R
S  such that the following three properties hold for each S  
(Tijs, 2003): 
( ) VS is a non-empty closed proper subset of R
S ; 
( ) VS is comprehensive, i.e. if  ( ) ∈ x VS and  R
S y∈  such that  ≤ yx , then  () ∈ yV S . 
( ) ( ) { } R| ,
n
i x xv i x V N ∈≥∈  is bounded, where  ( ) vi is the maximum of  { } () Vi. 
Note that R
S  is defined as follows: 
{ } R: R
S fS =→ . 
This notation is useful in order to distinguish, for example, between  { } { } 1,2 1,3 R  and  R .  It is 
possible to turn R
S  into R
n  setting the coordinates not belonging to S equal to zero. 
The elements of N  are players, who can cooperate.  If coalition S  forms, then each of the 
payoff vectors  () ∈ x VS is attainable, giving reward (utility)  i x  to player  ∈ iS . 





VS x x vS
∈
⎧ ⎫
=∈ ≤ ⎨ ⎬
⎩⎭ ∑ . 
A two-person bargaining game ( ) , Sd  can be seen as a 2-person NTU-game  { } () 1, 2 ,V  
where 
{ } () ] ( 1 1, =− ∞ Vd ,  { } ( ) ] ( 2 2, =− ∞ Vd  
{ } ( ) 1, 2 = VS . 
COST GAMES 
In this section we will underline the link between cooperative Game Theory and the analysis 
of the allocation of costs (and gains) within a group of players. 
By cost-sharing problem, we usually mean a problem arising when a group has to decide how 
to allocate costs of a joint enterprise.  A cost-sharing problem can be modelled in CGT using 
a cost-game. 
To introduce cost games we use a very typical situation of multipurpose joint project.  Let 
{ } 1,2,..., Nn = be a set of projects, products, or services (or agents).  The projects can be 
provided jointly or separately by some organization.  Let  ( ) cibe the cost of providing i by 
itself, and for each subset SN ⊆  let  ( ) cS be the cost of providing the items to S jointly.  For 
convenience, we set  ( ) 0 c ∅= . (We assume that if the project is not undertaken, then the cost   22
is zero.)  The function  ( ) cS from the subsets S of N to the real numbers is called cost 
function on N, or, sometimes, cost-sharing game. 
On the other hand, the cost-savings function (also identified with the corresponding cost-
savings game) is  ( ) ( ) ( ) iS vS ci cS
∈ =− ∑ and it represents the gain from carrying the projects 
in S jointly, rather than separately by i.  If  ( ) ( ), vN vS S N ≥∀ ⊆ , then the multipurpose 
project is efficient and the problem is to allocate the cost  ( ) cNin an equitable way among 
the projects. 
In some contexts it is natural to interpret  ( ) cS as the least costly way to carry out the 
projects in S.  If the cost function is interpreted in this way, then for any partition of a subset 
of projects into two disjoint subsets  ' S  and  '' S , we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) '' ' ' ' ' cS S cS cS ∪≤ + . 
This property is known as subadditivity (equivalent to superadditivity for v). 
A second “natural” property of a cost function is that costs increase as the number of projects 
increase, that is 
( ) ( ) '   for all   ' cS cS S S ≤ ⊆ . 
Such a cost function is called monotonic. 
If c is subadditive, then v is nonnegative and monotonically increasing in S.  
In fact,  , '  and   SS i S ∀∉ , subadditivity implies that  ( ) ( ) ( ) cS i cS ci +≤ + , and it follows 
that  ( ) ( ) vS vS i ≤+ . Since  ( ) 0 v ∅= , v is nonnegative and monotonic. 
It also follows that v(N) is the largest among all v(S).  In this case, from a formal point of 
view, N is the efficient set of projects to undertake.   
Usually in the cost games the terms allocation or solution for the problem (c, N) stand for the 
vector  ( ) 1,, R
N
n xx x =∈ K  such that  ( ) i iNx cN
∈ = ∑  where xi is the amount charged to 
project  i, while in general when we require the efficiency condition, we talk about pre-
imputations.  
A cost allocation rule or cost sharing rule is a function Φ(c) that associates a unique solution 
to every cost-sharing game. 
Cost-sharing rules 
“A cost sharing rule allocates the total cost of a project among the members of a group that 
participate in that project for every possible specification of the cost function.  An allocation 
is in the Core of the cost-sharing game if no participant, or group of participants, pays more 
than its stand-alone cost.” (Young, 1994). 
As we can see, two of the CGT concepts we introduced in the previous sections immediately 
come out: the imputation set and the Core. 
The Core can be interpreted, in such situations, as an incentive for the parties to cooperate.  A 
first requirement for a cost allocation is that no participant or group of participants be charged 
more than their stand-alone costs. 
Formally:   23
( ) i iNx cN
∈ = ∑  
( ) ( ) ( ) ,  where   i iS x Sc S x S x
∈ ≤= ∑ . 
How to select an equitable allocation in the Core?  And how to find out a cost allocation if 
the cost-game has an empty Core? 
The above reported solution concepts can obviously be useful in this framework also, but 
some problems still remain and many studies’ results are that no cost-sharing method can be 
universally preferred. 
The Shapley value can be interpreted from a cost-sharing point of view in the following way: 
“Given a cost-sharing game on a fixed set of players, let the players join the cooperative 
enterprise one at a time in some predetermined order.  As each player joins, the number of 
players to be served increases.  The player’s cost contribution is his net addition to cost when 
he joins, that is, the incremental cost of adding him to the group of players that has already 
joined.  The Shapley value of a player is his average cost contribution over all possible 
orderings of the players.” (Young, 1994).  Here the player’s cost contribution has to be 
referred to as his marginal contribution.  
Then, the Shapley value can also be formulated as 
( ) () ( ) i
SN - i
S! N-S-1!




⎡ ⎤ =+ ⎣ ⎦ ∑ . 
Following is an overview on the main cost sharing rules in the literature (the “classical” ones 
plus some more recent methods).  Almost all the methods charge a minimum cost called 
separable cost, that is, in a multipurpose project, a change is imposed due to adding a project 
to the set of the others: 
( ) ( ) i SC c N c N i = −− . 






SC SC c N
=
=≤ ∑ . 
and the remaining allocation problem turns to be the allocation of the non-separable costs: 
( ) NSC c N SC =− . 
A possibility is to equally allocate the NSC among the projects (Egalitarian Non separable 






The Alternate Cost Avoided (ACA) and the Separable Cost Remaining 
Benefits (SCRB) methods  
Another method proposed by a TVA consultant, Martin Glaeser, in 1938, assigns to each 














This method attributes to a project its separable cost and a rate of the NSC proportional to 
ii cS C − .  This difference is the Alternate Cost Avoided. 
A modification of this method is the allocation method, which has gained widest acceptance 
among water resource engineers and is still in use. 
In this modification c(i) is replaced by min [b(i), c(i)] in the following equation 













− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ =+
− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ∑
. 
This is called Separable Cost Remaining Benefits method (James and Lee, 1971) and it 
incorporates benefits as follows.  Let b(i) be the benefit from undertaking project i by itself.  
Then the maximum justifiable expenditure for i is min[b(i), c(i)]. 
The ACA method allocates cost savings in proportion to each project’s marginal contribution 
to savings (Straffin and Heaney, 1981). 
This solution was proposed independently in the game theory literature as a means of 
minimizing players’ “propensity to disrupt” (Gately (1974), Littlechild and Vaidya (1976), 
Charnes et al. (1979)). 
Gately’s definition of propensity to disrupt was: 







= − . 
This equation represents the ratio of what the members of coalition N - i would loose if player 
i disrupted the grand coalition, to what player i himself would lose. 
Straffin and Heaney showed that Gately’s apportionment method, based on minimizing the 
maximum propensity to disrupt, is exactly the ACA method.  
There is no reason to think that the ACA method yields a solution in the Core, and indeed it 
does generally not.  However when there are three projects at most, and the cost function is 
subadditive, then it is in the Core, provided that the Core is nonempty. 
Dickinson and Heaney have proposed a modification to the SCRB
  (1982): the Minimum 
Costs Remaining Savings (MCRS) method. 
Driessen and Tijs
 (1986) proposed another cost allocation method, deriving from the τ - 
value, that is the Non Separable Cost Gap (NSCG) method. 
Monotonicity 
Up to this point we have implicitly assumed that all cost information is at hand, and the 
agents need only to reach an agreement on the final allocation.  
In practice, however, the parties may need to make an agreement before the actual costs are 
known, and they commit themselves to a rule for allocating costs rather than to a single cost 
allocation. 
This turns our attention to the type of rule on which the players will agree.  For example, if 
total costs were higher than anticipated, it would be unreasonable for any player’s charge to   25
go down.  Similarly, if costs were lower, it would be unreasonable for any player’s charge to 
go up.  
Formally an allocation rule Φ is monotonic (in the aggregate) if for any set of projects N, and 
for any cost functions c and c’ on N: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) '   and   '   for all   ≥= ⊂ cN c N cS c S S N  
implies 
( ) ( ) '   for all   Φ ≥Φ ∈ ii cc i N . 
We say that the cost allocation method Φ is coalitionally monotonic if an increase in the cost 
of any particular coalition implies, ceteris paribus, no decrease in the allocation to any 
member of that coalition.  That is, for every set of projects N, every two cost functions c and 
c’ on N, and every T ⊆ N. 
In the same way  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) '   and   '   for all   ≥= ≠ cT c T cS cS S T  
implies 
( ) ( ) '   for all   Φ ≥Φ ∈ ii cc i T . 
There is a theorem (Young, 1985) stating that: for ⏐N⏐≥ 5 there exists no Core allocation 
method that is coalitionally monotonic. 
, α β AND γ -CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTIONS 
As we saw in the previous sections CGT models require defining a real-valued function (the 
characteristic function) assigning a real number to every coalition of players.  
The worth of a coalition is what it can achieve on its own without the cooperation of non-
members.  If there are no externalities, i.e., if the payoffs of the members of a coalition do not 
depend on the actions of non-members, the model doesn’t have to take into account the 
actions of the non-members.  But if there are externalities, then it is a must. 
There are several examples of externalities such as the market externalities and the 
environmental externalities (Finus, 2003).  
If we admit the possibility of binding agreements among a subset S of players, there are 
different ways to get v(S) and, in general, the characteristic function v of the game, depending 
on the assumptions about the behavior of the players outside the coalition.  Thus, in the 
literature, we find for example the  , α β  and γ -characteristic functions. (As a consequence, 
 and  α β −− Core were defined by Aumann (1959).) 
In the α - characteristic function it is assumed that when a coalition S forms the players 
outside the coalition ( ) \ NSchoose a strategy implying the worst outcome for S; it is the so-
called maximin outcome.  Formally: 
( ) ( )
\\
\ max min ,
NS NS SS
SS N S xX xX vS xx α π
∈ ∈ = , 
where 
S X  is the set of possible strategies for coalition S ,  
\ NS X  is the set of possible strategies for coalition  \ NS , .   26
and  S π  is the payoff function of coalition S  (equal to the sum of payoff functions of players 
belonging to S ). 
In the β - characteristic function it is assumed that the players in  \ NS  give more chances to 
the players in S , and let them reach at least  ( ) vS β , that is the minimum among the 
maximum payoffs that S can obtain once fixed the strategies of the other players. 
This is called the minimax outcome: 
( ) ( )
\\
\ min max ,
NS NS SS
SS N S xX xX vS xx β π
∈ ∈ = . 
Somehow, the α - characteristic function represents a pessimistic point of view (of the 
players in S ), while the β - characteristic function represents an optimistic perception. 
There is also another important interpretation of the behavior of the players outside S , 
leading to the γ -characteristic function, developed by Tulkens (1979), and Chander and 
Tulkens (1992 and 1993).  In this case it is assumed that players outside S  do not play 
against it choosing the worst strategy for S , but they try to reach the Nash equilibrium of the 
game, with S  considered as a single player.  It is important to underline that, in their 
framework, Chander and Tulkens prove that the Nash equilibrium reached is unique; this 
result is not extendible to all the strategic interactions, since the Nash equilibrium might not 
be unique, and, furthermore, different equilibria lead to different payoffs for the players.  
Formally: 




SS N S xX vS xx γ π
∈ =  
where 
*
\ NS x  is the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game above mentioned. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
With increased competition over natural resources and environmental amenities, decision 
makers face strategic decisions in various management and use aspects.  Cooperation 
approaches have been used in many cases, and were proven to be useful under certain 
conditions.  In this review we provide information on various Cooperative Game Theory 
(CGT) concepts, their theoretical basis and application difficulties.   
Several points have to be highlighted.  CGT focuses on answering questions such as which 
coalitions can be formed?  And how can the coalitional gains be divided in order to secure a 
sustainable agreement?  In particular, CGT favors solutions that include all possible players 
(Grand Coalition), and thus most CGT solution concepts refer to the Grand Coalition.  While 
this may not be always a desired or even feasible goal, in relatively small groups of interested 
parties (players) the coalitional transaction costs are relatively low and could be ignored.  
Thus, for relatively small environments, the promotion of the Grand Coalition is desirable. 
Another important aspect associated with the solution concepts of CGT is the equitable and 
fair sharing of the cooperation gains.  Equity is something dealt with in everyday life.  It is 
implicitly on the agenda of agencies that are responsible to setting rules for the allocation of 
natural resources among users.  Thus, equity should be viewed in a comprehensive way, that 
is, social justice: a proper distribution of resources, welfare, rights, duties, opportunities.   
Equity can also be viewed in a narrow framework, for example, how to solve everyday 
distributive problems.  While this second view is the one addressed more frequently by CGT, 
it is still able at providing a wider look at such issues.   27
Acknowledging the shortcoming of CGT is important in appreciating its ability. As an 
axiomatic approach it has two weaknesses: first, the axioms, reasonable by themselves, may 
lead to “impossibility theorems”; second, the axiomatic method may result in a solution that 
is way too far from the practical problem dealt with: the perceived equity always depends on 
the particulars of the case.  The various approaches reviewed in this paper and the examples 
used to demonstrate their application were selected to reflect both the opportunity and the 
difficulties embedded in CGT.   28
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